¶1From apparently conspiring to steal elections to abusing staff or performing embarrassing dance moves, the last few years have seen plenty of fake content made about politicians intended to malign its targets and mislead the public. Now EU rules aim to stem the flood of this deceptive content: starting from Sunday, artificially generated images, audio and text designed to look authentic must be labelled. The rules, devised under the EU’s landmark AI Act, mean companies must ensure people know when they are interacting with an AI-powered chatbot or viewing a manipulated image or AI-generated text.
¶2The rules apply to new AI systems on the EU market from 2 August, while existing ones have an extra four months to comply. “It is a matter not only of customer protection, it’s also a matter of democracy protection,” the Green MEP Sergey Lagodinsky, who helped negotiate the AI Act, told the Guardian. “Making transparent this information is something which we need to preserve our democracy and the authenticity of facts online.” Under the rules, synthetic text, images, video and audio designed to look truthful must be visibly marked as AI-generated and contain a digital watermark to show the artificial origins of the content. Texts on matters of public interest must also be labelled as AI-made if there is no human editorial oversight. Companies are encouraged to label AI-generated content pre-dating the rules, although this is not compulsory. The rules will not apply to users’ personal content and there is an exemption for “evidently artistic”, satirical and fictional works. Failure to comply could result in fines of up to €15m (£12.8) or 3% of a company’s worldwide global turnover. The EU executive has created black-and-white labels anyone can use, although companies can design their own.
¶3Deepfakes have included audio purporting to reveal the Slovakian opposition leader Michal Šimečka conspiring with a journalist to rig elections, mocked-up videos of the French president, Emmanuel Macron, dancing in a 1980s nightclub, and fake footage of the then UK Labour leader, Keir Starmer, abusing party staff. The tech industry says it supports the quest to make deepfakes visible, but fears the rules will be interpreted too broadly and overwhelm internet users with banners and labels. The Computer and Communications Industry Association argues that EU guidelines published in July have expanded the definition of a deepfake far beyond the 2024 AI Act. “The label was meant to flag deceptive content,” said CCIA Europe’s AI policy lead, Boniface de Champris. “That distinction has been removed, so now almost everything gets labelled – a landscape in an advert is the same as a manipulated political speech. Like cookie banners, once labels are everywhere, users stop noticing them. That doesn’t protect anyone, it just burdens commercial activity across the board.” He thinks the most visible change for the public will not be on social media, which “already labels most AI content” but “in areas where AI is already used at scale but people don’t know it – advertising, film, publishing”. “Expect a lot more labels in sectors not usually associated with AI, and the burden will fall hardest on those least versed in AI regulation,” De Champris said.
¶4Some of the world’s largest tech companies already have policies designed to inform users about AI-generated content. TikTok, for example, says it requires creators to label realistic AI-generated images, audio and video, and that it has helped label more than 3bn pieces of content. However, recent research has shown that AI-generated doctors are gaining millions of views on TikTok by spreading dubious health advice. Google launched a tool called SynthID in 2023, which enables users to check if an image is AI-generated. The company says it has put an invisible digital watermark, which enables identification, on more than 100bn images and 60,000 years’ worth of audio. Google and Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, have signed a voluntary code of practice intended to help companies comply with the EU’s AI transparency rules. The European Commission said more than 180 organisations had signed the code, which was drawn up by independent experts under the supervision of the EU AI office. Signing the code is seen by regulators as a sign of good intent, while non-signatories must show they are meeting the rules in other ways. Meta launched policies in 2024 to help people identify AI-generated photo-realistic images. It says it has been developing industry-wide technical standards to identify AI audio and video.
¶5Announcing Meta’s intention to sign the EU code of practice earlier this week [28 July], its vice-president for public policy in Europe, Markus Reinisch, said: “We must avoid a situation where online content is subject to a growing array of different labels and disclosures that end up overwhelming people, while at the same time adding additional regulatory complexity for providers.” Lagodinsky, the EU lawmaker, said he believed the industry could find a way: “I have a deep respect for industry, but in all too many cases, they complain, and … then after things are implemented, it doesn’t look that burdensome to them. And there is always a solution.”
¶6The transparency rules are part of broader enforcement of the AI Act, starting from 2 August. The commission’s lead official on tech policy, Henna Virkkunen, said AI was a “transformative technology” that could bring “extraordinary benefits” but the most advanced models “create risks on an entirely new scale”. “Europe anticipated this development. With the AI Act, we established a clear, risk-based and durable framework for trustworthy AI — one that gives innovators legal certainty while protecting the public interest.”
| malign | v. | 비방하다, 해를 끼치다 | intended to malign its targets and mislead the public |
| mislead | v. | 오도하다, 속이다 | malign its targets and mislead the public |
| stem | v. | (흐름을) 막다, 저지하다 | EU rules aim to stem the flood of this deceptive content |
| deceptive | adj. | 기만적인, 속이는 | The label was meant to flag deceptive content |
| authentic-looking | adj. | 진짜처럼 보이는 | AI labels to be compulsory on authentic-looking content |
| compulsory | adj. | 의무적인, 강제의 | although this is not compulsory |
| devise | v. | 고안하다, 만들어 내다 | The rules, devised under the EU’s landmark AI Act |
| landmark | adj. | 획기적인, 기념비적인 | the EU’s landmark AI Act |
| comply | v. | (규칙을) 준수하다 | existing ones have an extra four months to comply |
| synthetic | adj. | 합성된, 인공의 | synthetic text, images, video and audio designed to look truthful must be visibly marked as AI-generated |
| watermark | n. | 워터마크(출처 식별 표시) | contain a digital watermark to show the artificial origins of the content |
| editorial oversight | n. | 편집상의 감독(사람의 검토) | if there is no human editorial oversight |
| pre-date | v. | ~보다 먼저 존재하다 | label AI-generated content pre-dating the rules |
| exemption | n. | 면제, 적용 제외 | there is an exemption for “evidently artistic”, satirical and fictional works |
| satirical | adj. | 풍자적인 | “evidently artistic”, satirical and fictional works |
| turnover | n. | 매출액 | 3% of a company’s worldwide global turnover |
| purport | v. | ~이라고 (거짓으로) 주장하다, ~인 척하다 | audio purporting to reveal the Slovakian opposition leader |
| rig | v. | (선거 등을) 조작하다 | conspiring with a journalist to rig elections |
| mocked-up | adj. | 가짜로 꾸며 만든 | mocked-up videos of the French president |
| overwhelm | v. | 압도하다, 질리게 하다 | overwhelm internet users with banners and labels |
| burden | v./n. | 부담을 지우다 / 부담 | it just burdens commercial activity across the board |
| across the board | phr. | 전반적으로, 일괄적으로 | it just burdens commercial activity across the board |
| versed in | adj. | ~에 정통한, 익숙한 | those least versed in AI regulation |
| dubious | adj. | 의심스러운, 수상한 | spreading dubious health advice |
| code of practice | n. | 실천 규범(행동 강령) | have signed a voluntary code of practice |
| non-signatory | n. | (협약) 비서명자 | non-signatories must show they are meeting the rules in other ways |
| disclosure | n. | 공개, 고지 | a growing array of different labels and disclosures |
| transformative | adj. | 변혁적인 | AI was a “transformative technology” |
| legal certainty | n. | 법적 확실성(예측 가능성) | gives innovators legal certainty while protecting the public interest |
¶1What are you into? What floats your boat? What music, films, clothes, art, books – anything, really – do you actually like? Do you find these questions more difficult to answer than you would have done 10 years ago? How about 20? You do? You’re not alone. It has become impossible to ignore: personal taste has been seriously debased – if not completely destroyed – by technological advancement. We know the internet has radically altered the way we form our opinions and beliefs. Now we’re waking up to another sobering truth: it has wrecked our capacity to form our own preferences. It used to go something like this. We experienced the outside world – including arts, culture and fashion – via a combination of community, geography, mass and specialist media, and serendipitous accidents. Exposed to a range of styles, genres and ideas, we would decide what appealed to us, and then attempt (with varying degrees of success) to consume and engage with those things.
¶2This is no longer the case. We increasingly encounter most aspects of the world through a single aperture: streaming and social media platforms. Or, more specifically, the algorithmic feeds of streaming and social media platforms, plus algorithmically optimised search engines and e-commerce sites, from Amazon to Vinted. In many cases, these are programmed to show each individual specific content based on data gathered from their own activities and those of other users – content that will ideally keep them on the platform for as long as possible. On Spotify, that can mean serving customers songs with superficial similarities to the tracks they didn’t skip last time; on Instagram, it might result in multiple appearances from an influencer whose videos have previously held our attention for a couple of minutes. We now experience reality via a limitless stream of content tailored around previous preferences.
¶3It’s a bewildering paradox: these platforms made personalisation a major part of their business model, then synthesised, commodified and automated individual taste into oblivion. We no longer choose what we want to consume; we take what we’re given. And we are being given it in such overwhelming quantities that we no longer have the mental capacity to properly digest and assess what we have encountered. It’s not merely the medium; it’s the message, too. In his 2024 book Filterworld, Kyle Chayka explains that because content that is “accessible” and “ambient” is most conducive to uninterrupted scrolling, “the least ambiguous, least disruptive and perhaps least meaningful pieces of culture are promoted the most” by algorithms.
¶4This is not a new phenomenon, but years of living like this have started to take their toll. I began noticing that it was affecting me at some point last year. Scrolling through reams of overtly nostalgic clothes, skipping through playlists of forgettably inoffensive pop and beholding endless promotional campaigns for films and TV shows indebted to existing IP, I felt zero enthusiasm for any of it. Consumer trends – from childlike wall art to splatter ceramics, mesh ballet flats to bandanas, Dubai chocolate to putting cottage cheese in everything – seemed to become inescapable overnight, buoyed by the algorithm and reaching tedious saturation point before I had even had the chance to decide what I thought of them (that said, I did make time to reconfirm my longstanding conviction that cottage cheese tastes like sick). For the first time since childhood, I had the disconcerting sensation of having no clue what it was I really liked.
¶5Perhaps I’m spending too much time on my phone. Perhaps I’m just getting old. To find out, I decide to step back in time and into the real world: to Portobello Road market in west London, to be precise – the place I spent hours and hours honing my own personal taste in the pre-algorithmic age (the mid-to-late 2000s). Alongside my unreasonably stylish school friend Lara, I would hunt for unusual secondhand things nobody else was wearing but that could just about pass for cool in a mainstream way. It was a creative challenge that I generally failed at, and my main hobby for most of my teenage years. I haven’t been back in a decade, so I’m heartened to discover it all completely unchanged: stalls of antique cameras and chintzy royal ceramics, of faded band T-shirts and cricket jumpers and mountains of tangled silver jewellery, plus a fair few rails of the kind of peculiar vintage items that it turns out still thrill me. It seems like a world immune to the algorithm-abetted taste crisis – until I start talking to stallholders and shoppers, all of whom describe a herd mentality among their customers and peers.
¶6Over the eight years she has had her vintage clothing business, Kerry has noticed a significant uptick in younger generations “wanting to fit in – they want to look like they belong”. It’s a concept she finds strange: she started vintage shopping as a teenager when she “couldn’t bear the thought of stepping out and looking like someone else”. Stephanie, 37, is visiting from California and searching for 1930s slip dresses. She sees her friends at home “wearing the exact same outfit – it’s very interesting to me because it takes away that personal aspect of your dressing”. Even if you do want to plough your own furrow, algorithm-sating fashion fads confuse matters. Helena, a 25-year-old stylist, is bored with the endless parade of microtrends. “They come around all the time and it’s always something that’s been done before. I hate when I see something that’s my vibe being turned into a microtrend – I’m, like, have I been influenced or is this actually me?”
¶7Ione Gamble has spent much of her career thinking about taste. In 2014, she founded Polyester, an alternative fashion and culture publication that uses the John Waters quote “Have faith in your own bad taste” as its tagline. Nowadays, “we’re always being told what to like and what not to like rather than being able to seek it out for ourselves”, she says. “It’s making us all feel powerless – we don’t have the power to train our own taste because there’s not the room in the day any more.” Recently, Gamble invited a selection of writers to muse on the subject for an essay collection titled The Polyester Book of (Bad) Taste. In her chapter, the novelist Nicola Dinan writes about feeling like “a driverless car” when it comes to her cultural consumption in today’s landscape. I can’t think of a better analogy. This sorry state of affairs has been broadly tolerated. However, this year has provided us with two pop cultural moments that neatly illustrate that the mood could be souring.
¶8First, there’s the ascension of Carolyn Bessette Kennedy – who died alongside her husband, John F Kennedy Jr, in a 1999 plane crash – to 2026’s number one fashion icon. The New Yorker’s neutral, distinctively pared-back, turn-of-the-millennium style has long served as a fount of inspiration online, but when the biopic TV series Love Story aired in February, it catapulted her outfits to ubiquity. Cue blanket media coverage on how to imitate her dress sense in the most literal way imaginable: Marks & Spencer promoted its “90s edit” by dressing a Bessette Kennedy lookalike in small sunglasses and monochrome outfits to recreate paparazzi images. Vogue even provided a checklist: boot-cut jeans, tortoiseshell headband, camel skirt … It reminded me of being 14 and scouring the rails of Topshop for something I could imagine Kate Moss wearing. Except nowadays no scouring or imagination is required; the e-commerce algorithms will sort you out in milliseconds.
¶9“CBK-core” is one of a catalogue of intense crazes fashion revolves around while maintaining a baseline of nondisruptive monotony (see also: the relentless churn of TikTok aesthetics – tomato girl, balletcore, coastal grandmother – that codify taste in a juvenile but also very risk-averse way). Yet the fact this particular trend had an actual person at its centre highlights how far into adolescent copy catting we have drifted – something Bessette Kennedy’s friend Carole Radziwill has pointed out. “She did what felt natural to her,” she told a podcast, claiming the appropriation of her style was “irritating […] The takeaway is not to mimic her style. The takeaway is to do and wear what feels most authentic to you.”
¶10But working out what feels authentic to us has become very difficult since we subcontracted out those instincts – and left them wide open to corporate manipulation. Last year, a young guitar band began gaining a lot of attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet the hype around New York outfit Geese was so extreme and pervasive that some people began to suspect they were a music industry “plant”. Not without justification, it turned out. In March, it was revealed that Geese (alongside acts including Alex Warren, Sombr and Zara Larsson) had made use of the marketing services of a firm called Chaotic Good Projects, whose founders half-jokingly claim to have studied TikTok algorithms at “collegiate level”. To help tracks go viral, Chaotic Good runs a huge number of social media accounts, which post content soundtracked by its clients’ songs in order to synthesise virality – a tactic it calls “trend simulation”.
¶11Of course, cultivated excitement is one of the bedrocks of the music industry; acts don’t usually become popular through a groundswell of organic sentiment. Yet until a couple of months ago, many of us were under the impression that online popularity was at least partly a reflection of genuine interest and enjoyment. Wrong. In May, the New York magazine writer Lane Brown explained the art of “clipping” – stealth advertising campaigns that involve paying members of the public to flood social media with content about a specific musician, say, or TV show. This can trick the algorithm into detecting widespread enthusiasm and therefore promoting the product further (among many others, the writer found evidence for campaigns related to the singer-songwriter Noah Kahan and Netflix thriller The Night Agent). One person in the industry estimated that “90% of what you see on the internet is advertising in disguise”.
¶12The reason Geese’s use of algorithm-gaming marketing garnered so much interest was – I suspect – because for many people becoming a fan of the band had proven they were still able to feel genuine zeal for sophisticated, slightly subversive new music. By which I mean they might have felt tricked into believing they still had good taste. This is probably a good moment to define what taste is and explain why it matters. On one level, it is extremely simple: it’s what you like and what you don’t. Taste can be superficial – in fact, it’s often a joyfully frivolous act (preferring one jumper to another, for example) – but it is also right at the core of our identities. Taste isn’t just your takeaway order, the comedy that tickles you or what you call your children; in her seminal 1964 essay Notes on Camp, Susan Sontag sets out taste’s all-encompassing nature. “There’s taste in people, visual taste, taste in emotion […] Intelligence, as well, is really a kind of taste – a taste in ideas.” It is crucial for making art, not just consuming it. Taste, Sontag writes, “governs every free – as opposed to rote – human response”.
¶13Some of these responses will be pre-programmed. Taste is shaped by class and background. There is also a strong social element: buying a specific model of car or going to a particular gig is often nothing more than a way of signifying that you belong – or want to belong – to a certain group. This was the argument put forward by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu in his 1979 work Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste – a theory that now seems so obvious it’s barely worth stating. (For an excellent visualisation of interior design taste in the British class system, see Grayson Perry’s 2012 tapestry series The Vanity of Small Differences.) To flout or subvert stylistic codes you have to be fluent in them – and the higher up the class structure you sit, the more latitude you have to do so. Think of the lord of the manor free to indulge his sartorial eccentricities versus uniformed blue-collar workers. In theory, though, anyone can break the rules; the most experimental dressing in the 20th century came from grassroots subcultures such as punk and the New Romantics.
¶14In an ideal world, personal taste is a privilege and a pleasure we should all have – it is the closest thing most of us get to self-expression or a creative act. At best, we can use it to consolidate our identities. It involves commitment and consistency (the opposite to all those microtrends) and some element of risk: knowing the things you like won’t appeal to everyone. “Taste, when it’s successful, is a tool to make you feel more like yourself,” says Gamble. If you dismiss taste as trivial, or see it as purely imitative, you are dismissing what it is to be a person.
¶15And yet, perplexingly, one of the ways the internet destroyed personal taste was by prioritising it above anything else. By making taste – at least the most passive yet performative version of it – our defining quality, streaming and social media platforms boiled humanity down to data-producing nodes of consumption. Nathalie Olah’s book Bad Taste examines the politics of taste in the 2010s. In it, she writes about how middlebrow millennial “good” taste – muted colours, expensive candles, pot plants, coffee-shop coffees – became an online performance of capability and authority amid post-2008 financial precarity. We had little economic capital, but we had the supposed cultural capital of curating our lives, tastefully, on social media. It was a neoliberal con – and proof that being reduced purely to our tastes is just as dehumanising as having none.
¶16On that front, it’s bad news: tech bros are the architects of our destinies and they have big taste‑based plans for humanity. In February, OpenAI’s president, Greg Brockman, posted on X that “taste is a new core skill”. He was echoing the sentiments of his former colleague Krithika Shankarraman, who last year told an interviewer that “taste is going to become a distinguishing factor in the age of AI”. Taste, the thinking goes, is the one human quality artificial intelligence will not be able to replicate. The concept of personal taste being a “moat” – a tech‑world term meaning a unique structural advantage that protects a company’s profitability – has taken root across the board.
¶17In fact, Silicon Valley’s sudden interest in taste goes way beyond such pronouncements. Tech companies are increasingly attempting to align themselves with current ideas of good taste: the spy tech firm Palantir released a blue chore jacket; the AI company Anthropic produced caps embroidered with the word “thinking” (in all lowercase); while OpenAI’s merch includes football shirts and hipster-coded graphic hoodies. It is also muscling in on old-school gatekeepers. Exhibit A: Jeff Bezos’s involvement in May’s Met Gala – high fashion’s biggest night of the year – which saw the Amazon boss and his wife pay a reported $10m to serve as “honorary chairs” (and therefore VIP guests). Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg was also present, fresh from sitting in the front row at Prada’s Milan show in February. Why is this happening? In a March column for the New Yorker, Chayka referred to this as “taste-washing” – an attempt to make our AI-dominated future more palatable. “To me, Silicon Valley’s use of taste is just PR or a marketing effort that gives them a veneer of humanity to hide automation behind,” he tells me.
¶18It’s no coincidence that this obsession with taste is happening at a time when AI content is dominating our feeds. It is estimated that about 71% of the images shared online are now AI-generated, as are more than a third of podcasts, while last year Spotify removed 75m AI tracks. While such content may seem novel, it will only take us further down the same path. “I see generative AI as a successor to algorithmic sameness,” says Chayka. “Algorithms encouraged humans to produce generic content, while AI just generates the generic content right away. Now we call that kind of generic content ‘slop’. So the patterns are still there, and we often are consuming AI content through the same algorithmic feeds. It remains a vicious cycle.”
¶19That driverless car we’re currently in? The wheels are falling off and it’s heading straight for the nearest AI swamp. Algorithms are dropping the pretence of being digital tastemakers and now often present us with content that appeals insidiously to our “primal instincts”, says Gamble. AI phenomena such as Fruit Love Island (the reality show fictionalised, with fruit) “is really colourful. It uses all the specific plot devices to hook you in. It’s basically content that’s tailored for eyeballs, not even enjoyment.” In The End of Taste, the final chapter of her book, Gamble writes that “we’re entering a new era in which good and bad taste is no longer a barometer worth thinking about”. But perhaps there’s an off-ramp for this nightmare. Carmen Vicente, a social media strategist in the tech world who writes a newsletter about the internet titled Scroll Sick, thinks the motivation “ultimately underpinning all of this taste-washing is fear – fear of losing power”. Tech bosses are trying to up their cultural capital and convince humans there is still meaning online because they can see a more unwelcome trend on the horizon. To reclaim our personal tastes (and cultural standards) we must abandon algorithm-driven platforms. And we kind of already are: the big worry for tech bosses is that social media use is only going in one direction. According to the Financial Times, time spent on social media peaked in 2022; a recent Ofcom survey showed a 12% drop in people posting on platforms in the past year. There are a few reasons for this, but one of them is algorithmic fatigue. “There’s plenty of backlash to algorithmic feeds,” says Chayka. “The active user base of Facebook has begun declining and I think platforms like Instagram and Spotify are now seen as less influential, creative or original than a few years back.”
¶20There are corners of the internet that are delivering on this front. The rise of short-form interview formats such as Dream Baby Press’s Love/Hate Lists and Perfectly Imperfect, which ask celebrities and creative people to name their favourite things – the more random and unpredictable, the better (film-maker Mary Bronstein recommending The Young Ones; music producer Danny L Harle waxing lyrical about tinned fried dace) – tap into a thirst for idiosyncratic, un-optimised, genuinely human preferences. Perfectly Imperfect (tagline: A taste of taste) was founded in 2020 by Tyler Bainbridge, who has said he “was growing frustrated with algorithms starting to define everyone’s tastes”. In 2024, he launched his own algorithm-free social media site, PI.FYI. Advertised as a rejection of “the AI-slop-filled dystopia of today”, it shares users’ recommendations in chronological order; to log on is to be faced with a list of unfiltered and very random cultural endorsements (during a brief browse of the music feed, I saw posts enthusing about tracks by Baha Men, 1990s German rave outfit Dune, and Siouxsie and the Banshees). With only 200,000 customers, PI.FYI is niche in itself – but the film recommendation site Letterboxd, which scratches a similar itch, has about 26 million.
¶21In his book, Chayka predicts a splintering of the internet into smaller independent platforms as this decade’s response to the distortion of algorithmic feeds. Two years on, he thinks “decentralisation is definitely here in the form of newsletter culture and Patreon-style crowdfunding models”. Newsletters – probably not coincidentally – tend to be centred on human taste: many feature recommendations of clothes, books, journalism, restaurants and other products. But are they really an antidote to algorithm-abetted shilling? In truth, this varies massively, from deeply researched, ad-free examples such as the food publication Vittles and The Browser, which finds the best online articles, to newsletters that publish sponsored posts and make ample use of affiliate links, meaning they get compensated when a reader buys a product they endorse. “The recommender economy can be great because you can find someone whose taste you really admire or aligns with yours,” says Erin Wylie, who co-founded the cult style newsletter Blackbird Spyplane with her partner, Jonah Weiner, in 2020. “I think the thing you have to remember is that almost all of these people are profiting off of what they’re recommending.” (Blackbird Spyplane doesn’t accept gifts or affiliate links for products, except books and one-off eBay or Etsy finds.)
¶22In a world where “every interaction is monetised” and “our primary function is to be shopping”, says Wylie, the only real way to reclaim taste as a form of identity and individuality is to stop consuming. At the end of last year, Wylie was feeling increasingly disconnected from her own tastes – an experience shared by friends equally fatigued by the “firehose of fashion imagery” emanating from their screens. To revive her enthusiasm, she set herself a challenge: she would spend an entire month wearing only black clothes she already owned. Introducing these limitations forced her to experiment with texture, silhouette and accessories – to treat outfits as a series of brain-teasers. The experiment worked, with Wylie concluding her newsletter on the subject by advising readers to “build yourself some productive constraints, to help focus your attention and clarify your appetites”.
¶23The biggest, most productive constraint we can give ourselves in an era of frictionless material acquisition? Get off the internet entirely. The idea of returning to the real world is something that is clearly appealing to young adults at the moment. “Is 2026 the year of analogue?” asked a Dazed headline in January, referring to the trend for sketchbooks, vinyl and film cameras. Gamble has noticed gen Z “picking up physical media again. I have started rebuying magazines that I had when I was a teenager so I can dig into references that aren’t just on Pinterest.”
¶24Back at Portobello Road market, I ask Helena for her offline fashion inspiration. It turns out to be her dad. “He’s a Tabi, cargos, T-shirt and big sunglasses wearer. It’s totally him – he isn’t online. He actually is that person.” It is hard not to notice that it’s the older clientele who look most distinctive – by a huge margin. I corner Pip, a milliner who is wearing a white coat embroidered with images of Inuit people, a mauve neck scarf and a flat knitted hat in a similar shade. She “hates” social media, and instead has been coming here for the past 20 years to look for items that “jump out”, her instincts having evolved via a deep familiarity with fashion history. “I went through a phase where I was really into 1950s clothing, then I went 40s, 30s, 20s, then Victorian stuff.” Nowadays, she is careful to mix eras but also wears things that make her “happy”, including her “massive collection” of conversation-starting Inuit coats.
¶25Despite the doom and gloom, I feel invigorated by my trip. Shopping is obviously not the answer, but rifling through rails of old clothes clarifies another core tenet of personal taste the latter-day internet has rendered impossible: liking something that isn’t meant for you. In fact, the more I think about taste, the more I realise it boils down to a leap of imagination: a counterintuitive combination of colours, for instance; or gradually attuning to a piece of music that initially seems alienating. There are no shortcuts or quick fixes: personal taste is something that requires the kind of quiet contemplation and creative thinking big tech is actively discouraging. (“Nobody wants to sit with thoughts. Sitting with thoughts: lame; AI can do that,” jokes Vicente.) When it comes to tuning into your own taste, Gamble’s advice is essentially the same. “Always question yourself. Why do I like that? Do I just like it because I’ve been shown it 100 times – or do I genuinely love it?”
| debase | v. | (가치·품위를) 떨어뜨리다 | personal taste has been seriously debased |
| serendipitous | adj. | 우연히 얻은(뜻밖의 행운의) | serendipitous accidents |
| aperture | n. | (좁은) 구멍, 창 | through a single aperture: streaming and social media platforms |
| tailored | adj. | ~에 맞춘, 맞춤형의 | a limitless stream of content tailored around previous preferences |
| commodify | v. | 상품화하다 | synthesised, commodified and automated individual taste into oblivion |
| oblivion | n. | 망각, 소멸 | automated individual taste into oblivion |
| ambient | adj. | 배경처럼 깔리는, 주의를 끌지 않는 | content that is “accessible” and “ambient” is most conducive to uninterrupted scrolling |
| conducive to | adj. | ~에 도움이 되는, ~을 촉진하는 | most conducive to uninterrupted scrolling |
| take one’s toll | idiom | 피해·악영향을 주다 | have started to take their toll |
| saturation | n. | 포화(상태) | reaching tedious saturation point |
| herd mentality | n. | 군중 심리 | describe a herd mentality among their customers and peers |
| uptick | n. | (소폭의) 증가 | a significant uptick in younger generations |
| plough your own furrow | idiom | 남과 다른 자기 길을 가다 | Even if you do want to plough your own furrow |
| microtrend | n. | 단기 소규모 유행 | bored with the endless parade of microtrends |
| ubiquity | n. | 어디에나 있음, 편재 | it catapulted her outfits to ubiquity |
| codify | v. | 규격화하다, 체계화하다 | codify taste in a juvenile but also very risk-averse way |
| risk-averse | adj. | 위험을 회피하는 | a juvenile but also very risk-averse way |
| subcontract out | v. | 외주를 주다(남에게 맡기다) | since we subcontracted out those instincts |
| groundswell | n. | (여론의) 고조, 자연스러운 확산 | a groundswell of organic sentiment |
| zeal | n. | 열의, 열정 | genuine zeal for sophisticated, slightly subversive new music |
| frivolous | adj. | 가벼운, 하찮은 | it’s often a joyfully frivolous act |
| rote | adj. | 기계적인, 습관적인 | governs every free – as opposed to rote – human response |
| latitude | n. | 재량, (행동의) 자유 | the more latitude you have to do so |
| moat | n. | 해자 → (기업의) 구조적 경쟁 우위 | a unique structural advantage that protects a company’s profitability |
| veneer | n. | 겉치장, 허울 | a veneer of humanity to hide automation behind |
| slop | n. | (질 낮은 AI 생성) 찌꺼기 콘텐츠 | Now we call that kind of generic content ‘slop’ |
| insidiously | adv. | 은밀하게, 서서히 해롭게 | content that appeals insidiously to our “primal instincts” |
| idiosyncratic | adj. | 특이한, 개인 특유의 | a thirst for idiosyncratic, un-optimised, genuinely human preferences |
| antidote | n. | 해독제, 해결책 | are they really an antidote to algorithm-abetted shilling? |
| counterintuitive | adj. | 직관에 반하는 | a counterintuitive combination of colours |
¶1Recently, Mike Hall, 48, a management consultant based in Winchester, decided to get ahead with Christmas preparations. “Do I buy the free range bronze turkey for 10-12, or 12-14, even though there are only seven of us for Christmas Day?” he wondered, attempting to tot up all the different variables. “What about leftovers? Should I buy two turkey crowns instead? And which ones?” Such granular decision-making went on and on, until eventually he gave up in exhaustion. He has not yet bought a turkey. Indecision when the decision is simple, or the options all acceptable, is the defining characteristic of “fear of better options” – or Fobo – a social phenomenon coined by Patrick McGinnis, a US venture capitalist and the man known for coining the term Fomo, or fear of missing out. Fobo can occur everywhere from minor decisions – what to watch on TV, what to eat for dinner – to more significant ones such as whether to take a new job. Whatever the case, a Fobo-afflicted person may find themselves overwhelmed by the possibilities of what might be (some call this “analysis paralysis”) even when no outcome is guaranteed, and when some of those options aren’t even on the table.
¶2A common example may be figuring out what to do on Friday night. Sure, the invitation to hang out with work colleagues is convenient and guaranteed to be enjoyable, but there is another party across town where something even more fun might be happening. Then there’s someone on Tinder who floated Friday night as a possible date, while your flatmates are heading to a restaurant opening. Someone with Fobo is likely to hold back on commitment, or commit then cancel. “I bail at the last minute, all the time” says Aoife O’Donaghue, 24, a recent graduate based in Edinburgh. Such dithering can be exhausting for friends and family who depend on someone for a firm commitment, and bring stress to the person themselves. For O’Donaghue, it’s always the smallest decisions she has the hardest time making. She describes a time at university where she was trying to figure out where to study - the library or a cafe. “I was thinking, ‘Will I work better in one place? Would I like a cup of tea? Will there be enough seats?’” O’Donaghue describes working herself up over this for 15 minutes until she had a stress-induced stomach ache. “I ended up going to the library, and then to the cafe. So it didn’t even really matter” she laughs ruefully.
¶3So what’s going on? McGinnis, who has been researching Fomo and Fobo over several years for his forthcoming book, and for his podcast Fomo Sapiens, argues that Fobo is not necessarily a new human behaviour. “These feelings are biologically part of who we are. I call it the biology of wanting the best. Our ancestors a million years ago were programmed to wait for the best because it meant they were more likely to succeed.” But the mass introduction of sophisticated technology and the internet has accelerated Fomo and Fobo into a common social behaviour. After all, we are now able to easily compare ourselves with each other (thus producing feelings of Fomo) and overwhelm ourselves with choice (producing Fobo). “Go on Amazon to buy a pair of white shoelaces and you have in excess of 200 choices, whereas 50 years ago you would go to Woolworths and choose between three,” says McGinnis. “So that’s the context. The other factor – which is more emotional – is that Fobo is driven by narcissism, because when you have Fobo, you’re putting your own interests well before anybody else’s, which leaves all the people around you on hold.”
¶4McGinnis himself experienced feelings of Fomo and Fobo when he coined the terms in a Harvard Business School paper 15 years ago. “Harvard is a place unlike others in terms of the amount of opportunities you have – classes, social events, interviews – at your disposal,” he says. “I came from a simple background – a small town in New England – and when I arrived I found it extremely overwhelming. I wanted to do everything – which is Fomo – but at the same time, I wasn’t willing to say no to anything and just choose one thing, which was Fobo. I would wait until the last minute to see if a better option came along. And I realised that that was a pervasive behaviour at Harvard because of it being a choice-rich environment.”
¶5This is the main difference between Fomo and Fobo. Anyone with a smartphone looking over the often manipulated and unrealistic lives of others on social media might feel Fomo. But Fobo, according to McGinnis, is an issue for the privileged. “Fobo is an affliction of affluence,” says McGinnis. “To have Fobo you must have options. So the richer you are, the more powerful you are, the more options you have. That’s when you start to feel it.” McGinnis doesn’t believe that Fobo is restricted to the individual either – large corporations can be affected by it (“a multinational with access to big data can always find a reason to justify not doing something”), and so can countries. “I have come to believe that the Brexit situation is Fobo. Fobo is the inability to choose between one of many acceptable outcomes. You may not like Brexit but there are plenty of acceptable ways it could be structured, without going to no deal. But any time Mrs May brought a proposal to the Commons, she couldn’t get a vote because all of the MPs were waiting for a slightly better option.”
¶6On the individual level, though, O’Donaghue is not entirely convinced. “I’m a privileged person, compared with other people. But I don’t think the things I’m choosing between are very luxurious. I’m talking about choosing dinner, or what’s on the telly. Maybe my problem is one of overthinking.”
¶7Decision-making is a complex mental procedure involving several of the brain’s executive functions, that is, the key cognitive processes your brain uses to control your behaviour – from planning to managing impulses. People with conditions such as ADHD and autism, where executive functions can be impaired, may find themselves struggling to choose between options.
¶8But is Fobo just an easy-to-swallow euphemism for something more serious or taboo, such as an anxiety disorder? Nicky Lidbetter, chief executive of the charity Anxiety UK, doesn’t think so. “It is possible for anxiety to be experienced around many different issues, of which a fear of choosing the wrong option in regards to big life decisions may be one,” she says. “Fear of a better option, however, is more likely to be linked to or a trigger for a pre-existing anxiety condition as opposed to being sufficient to warrant being categorised as an anxiety disorder in its own right.” So for those without pre-existing conditions, what exactly is everyone afraid of? What is the “fear” in Fobo? McGinnis says it is a “fear of letting go”. “In order to choose something you must let go of another thing and it’s the fear of having to mourn the road untaken. So we would rather not decide at all and keep all of our options open.”
¶9There is some psychological foundation to this. Some psychologists have found that when it comes to decision-making, people can be split into two groups: “maximisers” or “satisficers”. Maximisers are people who make a choice based on maximum benefit later on, while satisficers (a portmanteau of “satisfied” and “sufficed” first coined by the Nobel laureate Herbert Simon in 1956) will make choices based on a modest criteria.
¶10Maximisers, for example, may pay more for a bigger car than they actually need in case they want a bigger one in future, whereas a satisficer is likely to pick the car that is good for now. Maximisers set themselves high standards and are disappointed when they fail to reach them, lingering on what was lost rather than what they have. Both have been the subject of many studies, but one from 2011 conducted by a team led by Joyce Erlingher from Florida State University and published in the journal Personality and Individual Differences aimed to explore whether “maximisers show less commitment to their choices than satisficers in a way that leaves them less satisfied”. That is, are maximisers more likely to be unhappy with their choice, once they finally land on it? Their conclusion: a resounding yes. “Maximisers miss out on the psychological benefits of commitment,” the authors say. “Current research is trying to understand whether they can change. High-level maximisers certainly cause themselves a lot of grief.”
¶11Perhaps then, those with Fobo are simply maximisers facilitated by contemporary technology, or perhaps contemporary technology is turning more of us into maximisers. Or maybe people just don’t really want to do half the things they say they do. Whatever the case, for McGinnis, correctly identifying this phenomena and giving it a name is crucial in changing these behaviours, which he sees as being “destructive”. “It’s my view that Fomo isn’t all bad because Fomo can be that little whisper in your ear that we should try something different. If you see your friend starting a business on the side, or you see your friends going on a vacation to Malta and you feel Fomo, that’s a cue to try something else and open up your perspective. So a little Fomo is fine. But Fobo is not good.”
¶12O’Donaghue however, is not so concerned about tackling her Fobo. “I think its an inherent part of my personality,” she says. “People get used to you being like that if you’re good friends.”
¶13Neither is Hall. “It’s part of who I am, I have always been this way” he says. “Last year, it took four attempts and three hours for me to buy a turkey, looking across M&S, Waitrose, Tesco, Sainsbury’s. In fact, it got so late, they couldn’t even deliver it by the time I chose one.” But he is confident he will get this year’s turkey soon. He has already decided which one.
| granular | adj. | 아주 세세한 | Such granular decision-making went on and on |
| tot up | v. | 합산하다, 따져 보다 | attempting to tot up all the different variables |
| indecision | n. | 우유부단, 결정 못 함 | Indecision when the decision is simple |
| coin | v. | (새 말을) 만들어 내다 | a social phenomenon coined by Patrick McGinnis |
| venture capitalist | n. | 벤처 투자자 | a US venture capitalist |
| afflicted | adj. | (병·문제에) 시달리는 | a Fobo-afflicted person may find themselves overwhelmed by the possibilities |
| analysis paralysis | n. | 분석 마비(따지다가 결정 못 함) | some call this “analysis paralysis” |
| hold back on | v. | ~을 주저하다, 보류하다 | Someone with Fobo is likely to hold back on commitment |
| bail | v. | (약속을) 갑자기 취소하다 | I bail at the last minute, all the time |
| dithering | n. | 망설임, 우물쭈물 | Such dithering can be exhausting for friends and family |
| ruefully | adv. | 씁쓸하게, 후회하듯 | she laughs ruefully |
| accelerate | v. | 가속화하다 | has accelerated Fomo and Fobo into a common social behaviour |
| narcissism | n. | 자기애, 나르시시즘 | Fobo is driven by narcissism |
| on hold | phr. | 보류된, 대기 상태로 | which leaves all the people around you on hold |
| pervasive | adj. | 만연한, 널리 퍼진 | that was a pervasive behaviour at Harvard |
| affliction | n. | 고통, 병폐 | Fobo is an affliction of affluence |
| affluence | n. | 풍요, 부유 | Fobo is an affliction of affluence |
| executive functions | n. | (뇌의) 실행 기능 | involving several of the brain’s executive functions |
| impaired | adj. | 손상된, 약해진 | where executive functions can be impaired |
| euphemism | n. | 완곡어 | an easy-to-swallow euphemism for something more serious or taboo |
| pre-existing | adj. | 기존의, 이미 있던 | a trigger for a pre-existing anxiety condition |
| mourn | v. | 애도하다, 슬퍼하다 | the fear of having to mourn the road untaken |
| maximiser | n. | 최대화 추구자 | Maximisers are people who make a choice based on maximum benefit later on |
| satisficer | n. | 만족화 추구자(적당하면 만족) | satisficers (a portmanteau of “satisfied” and “sufficed” |
| portmanteau | n. | 혼성어(두 단어를 합친 말) | a portmanteau of “satisfied” and “sufficed” |
| linger on | v. | ~에 계속 머물러 생각하다 | lingering on what was lost rather than what they have |
| resounding | adj. | 확실한, 압도적인 | a resounding yes |
| grief | n. | 괴로움, 비탄 | High-level maximisers certainly cause themselves a lot of grief |
| inherent | adj. | 타고난, 고유한 | I think its an inherent part of my personality |